A: Introduction
The very nature of the adversarial
system of litigation we practice means that, at the end of every case filed in
court, there is a winner and a loser. The person who wins will look forward to
reaping the fruits of her judgment. The first step the winner must take in
order to enjoy the judgment is to file an entry of judgment. The purpose of
filing an entry of judgment is to inform the losing party what judgment has
been given by the court in favour of the winning party, the date of the
judgment, the name of the judge, the name of the court, etc. Without filing an
entry of judgment, the winner cannot enforce and enjoy the judgment. Since the
entry of judgment is the formal record of the judgment of the court, its
existence is the most cogent evidence that the judge pronounced judgment at or
after the trial.[1]
It is
drawn up (or simply put, prepared) by the lawyer for the successful party,
known as the judgment-creditor, and served personally on the losing party,
called the judgment-debtor, as a prelude to execution.
But in a recent case that was heard
before the Supreme Court,[2]
the Court gave certain directives to the effect that, drawing up of entry of
judgment must not be left in the hands of the winner’s (judgment-creditor)
lawyer. Rather, court registrars and judges must be the proper persons to state
what judgment the court gave. The Supreme Court went as far as to suggest that
the High Court rules of procedure[3]
must be amended to follow the provisions in the Supreme Court rules[4]
that state that, after a judgment is given, the registrar must issue a
certificate on the judgment and it must be signed by the presiding judge and
sealed.
In this article, the case of Asamoah v S.I.C
is discussed. The
directives that were given by the Supreme Court in the case are analyzed in
detail. The reasons given by the Supreme Court for issuing the directives are
examined and the Court’s preferred mode of drawing up entry of judgment is
discussed. The article argues that, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction
to make new ‘rules’ by way of directives to amend the High Court Rules of
Procedure, a jurisdiction reserved solely for the Rules of Court Committee by
the Constitution. The article concludes that, the current regime for drawing up
entry of judgment by judgment-creditors or their lawyers
under the High Court
Rules is adequate and the Supreme Court’s directives in Asamoah v S.I.C are not only pointless, but they are unlawful.
B
:
The case of
Asamoah
v S.I.C
The facts
: The appellant, an insurance company
called State Insurance Company Ltd (S.I.C) insured the respondent’s (Asamoah)
car under a comprehensive policy. The car was later snatched from Asamoah’s
wife by robbers and Asamoah claimed the value of the car under his
comprehensive insurance policy with S.I.C. S.I.C refused to pay and Asamoah
sued at the High Court for the car’s insured value of GH₵116,200 plus
interest.
Procedure
: Asamoah won the case at the High Court.
S.I.C was not happy with the judgment so they appealed against the judgment and
applied for stay of execution pending appeal. The Court of Appeal granted the
stay on terms and ordered S.I.C to pay the full judgment debt and interest into
court[5]
within 30 days. The Court of Appeal directed the registrar to put the money
into an income-yielding investment. S.I.C complied and paid the money into the
High Court. When the appeal was heard, S.I.C won the appeal. Asamoah then
appealed to the Supreme Court and he won. After winning his appeal at the
Supreme Court, Asamoah applied to withdraw the money paid into the High Court
plus the interest from the investment. The money was paid to him through his
lawyer. Asamoah’s lawyer later filed two notices of ‘entry of judgment’ in which
he calculated interest at the commercial rate on the money paid into court and
already withdrawn by him. The lawyer argued that the new claim for interest was
based on the Supreme Court’s order that Asamoah must be paid his money with
interest. S.I.C opposed the application. It is the claim for interest filed by
Asamoah in the two new ‘entry of judgment’ in the High Court after receiving
the money paid into court that resulted in the instant appeal before the
Supreme Court.
Issue
:
The issue the Supreme Court had to resolve was whether after withdrawing
the money plus interest paid into court, Asamoah was entitled to collect any
further interest from S.I.C.
Decision
:
The Supreme Court held that, Asamoah was not entitled to any further
interest beyond what was paid into court, invested and paid to him. The Court
reasoned that, Asamoah had not been kept out of his money. He applied to the
High Court and had the money, together with the interest from the investment,
released to him. He had, thus, been indemnified from any loss by the investment
made and interest accrued. Having gained access to the full value of the money,
Asamoah would be unjustly enriched if he were to be granted further interest as
was calculated in the subsequent notices of entry of judgment filed by his lawyer.
The Supreme Court added that, at the
time the Supreme Court heard the appeal and decided on it, it was not aware of
the Court of Appeal order for the payment of the judgment debt and interest
into court. Therefore, the order of the Supreme Court for calculation of
interest up to the date of final payment must be interpreted by the parties in
the light of the reality on the ground as at the date of its delivery. That is
to say, the amount and interest had already been paid into court.
Speaking on the legal effect of paying
money into court, Amegatcher, JSC stated that, it is a way of protecting funds
while the litigation is ongoing. Such payment into court is meant to satisfy
any potential liability. For instance, if a defendant is found liable, the
payment into court goes to the plaintiff. If the defendant is found not liable,
then the defendant gets a refund of the payment made into court. In cases of
appeal, such payments will remain in the court’s custody to ensure that, in the
event of the failure of the appeal, the respondent will have his money without
difficulty. In general, the procedure for ordering payment into court gives
litigants assurance that they will be able to collect any judgment awarded in
their favour.[6]
In summary, once payment has been made
into court and it satisfies the claim and the beneficiary accepts it, the
payment discharges the debtor from any further obligation, be it the principal
or interest. And any interest calculable on the debt due will cease to run from
the date the full principal is paid into court.
C:
The new regime conceived by the Supreme Court
In the course of giving its judgment
in Asamoah v S.I.C
, the Supreme Court
bemoaned the tendency by some parties and lawyers to file entries of judgment
that do not reflect the actual orders made by courts. The Court took the view
that, Asamoah’s lawyer was wrong in filing the new entries of judgment since he
knew the money was paid into court. The order made by the Supreme Court for
payment of interest up to the date of final payment was of no moment as it was
made without knowing the money was already in court, and in investment, too. Consequently,
the Court gave several directives towards reforms in the rules on entry of
judgment. It also called on the Rules of Court Committee to implement some of
the directives.
§
The
new role for registrars and judges in drawing up entry of judgment
According to the Supreme Court,
drawing up the entry of judgment after trial should not be left to the
judgment-creditor or his lawyer alone as provided in C.I 47. Judges and
registrars must make an input before the entry of judgment is filed. This is
what the Supreme Court said:
“If … the
judgment after trial is the formal record of the judgment and the most cogent
evidence that the judge pronounced that judgment at or after the trial, we do
not think it is appropriate for its drawing up to be left in the hands of one
party to the litigation without any input from the judge who delivered the
judgment.”[7]
In making this assertion, the Court found
fortification in the provision in the Supreme Court Rules[8]
which requires that a judgment or order made by the Supreme Court, to be
enforced in a trial court, must be accompanied by a certificate stating the
orders made by the Supreme Court, under the seal of the Supreme Court and
signed by presiding Supreme Court judge. The Court prescribed that procedure
for the High Court in place of the current procedure where the
judgment-creditor or her lawyer draws up and file the entry of judgment.
D:
The Supreme Court’s reasons for its preferred ‘new’ rules
It is trite learning that, under the
High Court Rules,[9]
it is
judgment-creditors or their lawyers who interpret the judgment and prepare or
draw up a notice of entry of judgment and file it at the registry. The Supreme
Court’s directives in Asamoah v S.I.C
showing a preference towards judges and registrars, instead of judgment-creditors
and their lawyers, to prepare entry of judgment were based on the following
triumvirate of reasons. The first reason given by the Court was that, judgment
creditors or their lawyers drafting and filing entry of judgment has posed problems
for administration of justice in Ghana because some parties deliberately
misstate the actual orders made by the court or the legal basis of their claim
before the court. For instance, a party may claim compound interest when no
such rate was part of the agreement between the parties or where the court made
no such order. Secondly, a party can enter judgment for recovery of possession
when no such relief was claimed and even if claimed, was not granted by the
court. Thirdly, an entry of judgment may not state the actual effect of a
declaratory relief made by the court and whether it is legal to enforce such
declaratory reliefs, the Supreme Court reasoned.
The
‘orders’ given by the Supreme Court
In the light of the three reasons set
forth above, the Supreme Court proposed several new ‘rules’ to regulate the
drawing up and filing of entry of judgment in Asamoah v S.I.C
. To experience the full force and effect of the proposals,
they are quoted in detail below:
“1. Trial judges are to summarise and
specifically state all enforceable orders made in their judgments at the end or
at the conclusion of the judgments. This
summary is to be recorded in the
Record Book as well. This will provide
guidelines to the parties, Counsel and
the registrars regarding the drawing up
and the filing of notices of judgment
after trial and the specific orders to be
enforced by way of execution. The
Judicial Secretary is ordered to bring this
directive to the attention of all
trial courts in the country and the Judicial Training
Institute.
2. Registrars of all courts are to
carefully review such notices of entry of judgment filed and satisfy themselves
that the contents represent the orders made by the court in the suit. When in
doubt, registrars should seek clarification from the judge who pronounced the
judgment before executing any documents for the enforcement of the judgment.
The Judicial Secretary is ordered to bring this directive to the attention of
all registrars of the courts in the country and the Judicial Training
Institute.
3. Counsel representing judgment-debtors
must carefully scrutinise notices of entry of judgment filed by their
colleagues and confirm that the contents are in line with the agreement of the
parties and/or the final orders made by the court. If the notice has been
misrepresented, it is the professional responsibility of the counsel to object
timeously to the terms filed and to apply to the court immediately to set aside
or rectify the notices. This is a duty owed their clients, the court and the
profession to expose wrongdoing and protect the sanctity of the justice
delivery system.
4. Counsel preparing and signing
notices of judgment after trial should be wary of the rules of professional
conduct which regulate their actions in court. We refer especially to Rule 63
(2) (e) & (f) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct and Etiquette)
Rules, 2020, L.I. 2423 which provides as follows:
a. Rule 63 (2) (e) Where a
lawyer acts as an advocate, that lawyer shall not knowingly attempt to deceive
a court or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence,
misstating a fact or law, presenting or relying on a false or deceptive
affidavit, supressing what ought to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in a
criminal or an illegal conduct.”
b. Rule 63 (2)(f) Where a
lawyer acts as an advocate, that lawyer shall not knowingly misstate the
content of a document, the testimony of a witness, the substance of an
argument, or the provision of an enactment or like authority.”
Any breach of these rules
by misstating the orders made by a court in the notices of entry of judgment
should henceforth be referred to the Disciplinary Committee of the General
Legal Council for the appropriate sanctions.
5. The Rules of Court Committee is
called upon to have a second look at the provisions in the rules which vest the
power to interpret and draw up the notice of judgment after trial solely in the
hands of the judgment-creditor and their counsel. Any review or amendments of
the rules should be geared towards averting injustices occasioned by
misrepresentation of court orders for the purposes of execution.”
E:
An analysis of the ‘directives’
The directives, on their face, may not
trouble anyone, even those familiar with legalistic eccentricities. This is so
because they appear to have the imprimatur of law coming, as they are, from the
highest and most revered court of the land. But a deeper analyses of the
‘orders’ reveal that, there is more to them than meets the eye. The orders are
discussed in detail below.
a.
Trial judges are to summarise and specifically state all enforceable orders
made
in
their judgments at the end or at the conclusion of the judgments.
This
directive looks rather harmless as it accords with best practice. But any such
practice must be introduced into the rules through the Rules of Court
Committee, and not the Supreme Court. So, for the Supreme Court to order the Judicial
Secretary to bring this directive to the attention of all trial courts in the
country and the Judicial Training Institute is, with all due respect, unlawful.
Neither the Constitution[10]
nor the Courts Act[11]
give the Supreme Court any powers to make rules to guide the procedures of
trial courts. As stated earlier, that jurisdiction is exercisable only by the
Rules of Court Committee and none other. It is submitted that, the Supreme
Court cannot nibble at that jurisdiction that is constitutionally reserved for
the Rules of Court Committee. For that reason, the ‘directive’ to trial courts
and the Judicial Training Institute is an illegality parading on stilts.
b.
Registrars
of all courts are to carefully review such notices of entry of judgment
filed;
if in doubt, they must consult the judge.
As noted earlier, the High Court Rules
state that,
the party seeking to have a judgment
entered should draw up the judgment and present it to the registrar for entry.[12]
The ‘party seeking to have a judgment entered’ is the party who won the case,
also known as the judgment- creditor. So the practice where a judgment-creditor
or her lawyer prepares and files an entry of judgment after trial rooted in
law, that is, C.I 47. The Supreme Court cannot, with the greatest respect,
supplant the Rules with their preferred procedure and order the Judicial
Secretary to carry it out. The Rule of Court Committee is the constitutionally
mandated body with power to make the rules that guide the practice and
procedures in all courts in Ghana.[13]
The Supreme Court’s role is to interpret and enforce the law, not to make the
law.[14]
If,
as the Supreme Court alleges, some of our citizens suffer injustice as a result
of wrong information included in entries of judgment, it is the Rules of Court
Committee that must address the allegations and make rules to cure the alleged
mischief. But definitely not the Supreme Court, and most definitely, not the
manner in which it seeks to do so.
At any rate, burdening our already
over-burdened registrars and judges to scrutinise, nay, draw up entry of
judgment after trial, is not an apposite counsel. The wheels of litigation
grind slowly as it is already. Taking away the few processes – such as entry of
judgment - that lawyers can prepare and file on their own outside the judicial
bureaucracy, rather detracts from any desire to curb injustice in the judicial
process. In any event, entry of judgment is filed whether the judgment given by
the court is interlocutory or final, and whether it is final based on a default
judgment or summary judgment or final based on a trial on the merits. Is it the
Supreme Court’s expectation that every entry of judgment, qua entry of
judgment, must be reviewed by a registrar, signed off by the judge and sealed
by the registrar before filing? Will the judgment-creditor still pay filing
fees on the entry of judgment she did not prepare? If the answers to these
questions are in the affirmative then, it is submitted that, judicial ingenuity
will be sorely taxed to address this conundrum.
This brings to mind the innovative
procedure that was introduced by C.I 47 regarding injunction applications but
was quickly killed by the judicial ‘system.’ Reference is made to the ‘system’
because nobody formally changed the rules but somehow, the rule was not
honoured in observance. I am referring to the provision in the Rules on
interlocutory injunction. The Rules provide that a party who applies for
interlocutory injunction can attach a draft of the order sought to the
application to facilitate speedy preparation and sealing of the order when the
application is granted.[15]
When the Rules came into operation in 2004 and some of us sought to
operationalize this rule, we were met with stiff resistance from the registrars
because they preferred orders drawn up at the court. We did not insist on the
law and we gave in. Judicial bureaucracy took over and the law maker’s intention
‘to facilitate speedy preparation and sealing of the order’ went with the wind.
We are still living with the consequences. Aloofness has become the legal
profession’s most recognizable trait, acquiescence its chief characteristic.
It is in this light that the Supreme
Court’s benign attempt at usurping the practitioner’s last hope of speedy
enforcement of judgment must be resisted and stopped in its tracks. If the
Supreme Court’s directives are allowed to gain a foothold, or, if we look on
for the Rules of Court Committee to pass some constitutional instrument to
confer a semblance of legitimacy on the so-called orders, we will be mourning
at our own funeral. In that case, we should not be surprised to awake to the
news that, all writs and statements of claim must be submitted to registrars
and judges to certify that, they disclose a cause of action against the intended
defendant before they are filed. This may sound rather bizarre today but in all
sincerity, who would have thought that a day would come when judgment-creditors’
lawyers will lose their lawful right to draw up entry of judgment on behalf of
their clients? In law, just as in politics, there are no immaculate conceptions.
c.
Counsel
representing judgment-debtors must carefully scrutinise notices of entry of
judgment filed by their colleagues and confirm that the contents are in line
with the agreement of the parties and/or the final orders made by the court:
The law recognizes that mistakes do occur in
the judicial process and that is why there are rules on amendment to correct
any such mistakes.[16]
Indeed,
in Akowuah v Amoo,[17]
the Supreme Court held that an error in an entry of judgment must be amended by
an order of the court through an application on notice to the other party. The
Court opined as follows:
“[a]
ssuming … that there was an error
in the initial entry of judgment, such error should be corrected by the
judicial process. In my respectful view, a judgment-creditor, who discovers his
error in filing such a vital process, should not be permitted to amend the
process on his own motion without resort to the judicial process by invoking
the court’s jurisdiction to correct the slip or omission through amendment with
notice to the judgment-debtor who is the affected party.”[18]
It is submitted that, this view taken
by the Court accorded with the general principles for amendments in correcting
mistakes in court pleadings and processes. Regrettably, this erudite opinion
was not considered by the Supreme Court in its decision in Asamoah v S.I.C.[19]
Perhaps,
if the Supreme Court had averted its mind to its previous decision in Akowuah v Amoo
, it would have been slow
in propounding new rules of procedure for drawing up entry of judgment, in
contumelious disregard of the existing rules and usurping the power exclusively
reserved under the Constitution for the Rules of Court Committee. If the Rules
make provision for amendments to correct mistakes, it beggars belief that the
Supreme Court will go to such an extreme to impute professional negligence to a
lawyer who dares draw up an entry of judgment with mistakes.
d.
Counsel
preparing and signing notices of judgment after trial should be wary of the
rules of professional conduct which regulate their actions in court… Any breach
of these rules by misstating the orders made by a court in the notices of entry
of judgment should henceforth be referred to the Disciplinary Committee of the
General Legal Council for the (sic) appropriate sanctions.
Perhaps,
of all the impugned orders made by the Supreme Court in Asamoah v S.I.C
, the most bizarre order of all is the one that
exposes a lawyer to disciplinary proceedings for mistakes in drawing up an entry
of judgment. For the Supreme Court to affix a mistake made by a lawyer in an
entry of judgment with professional irresponsibility is beyond belief. Now, in
a case in which the judgment-creditor represents herself, what will be her
sanction if she makes a mistake in drawing up an entry of judgment? The Supreme
Court’s latest fondness for the Disciplinary Committee of the General Legal
Council borders on the pathological.[20]
Will a mistake in making a claim in a writ and statement of claim also attract
quasi-criminal sanctions? If the same argument is made that a judge who makes a
mistake in a judgment or order must be sanctioned, how fair will that be?
e.
The
Rules of Court Committee is called upon to have a second look at the
provisions
in the rules which vest the power to interpret and draw up the notice
of
judgment after trial solely in the hands of the judgment creditor and their
Counsel.
Any review or amendments of the rules should be geared towards
averting
injustices occasioned by misrepresentation of court orders for the
purposes
of execution:
This ‘order’, it is submitted, should
have been the only order made by the Supreme Court. It recognizes that the
Rules of Court Committee is the only legitimate body to make rules of procedure
to guide the courts. It is submitted that, if the Supreme Court goads the
Judicial Secretary to carry out the first four unlawful orders, this last but
important directive will be rendered useless.
Be that as it may, the Supreme Court’s appetite for an amendment in the
Rules to side-step judgment-creditors and their lawyers regarding entry of
judgment is not a healthy one, as noted above. When, and if, any such amendment
is presented to the Rules of Court Committee, the members must be bold and tell
the sponsors: ‘Procul O! Procul este profani.’
F:
Must trial courts follow the procedure in the Supreme Court Rules?
To proffer a solution to the so-called
‘problem’ of leaving entry of judgment preparation in the hands of judgment
–creditors and their lawyers, the Supreme Court suggested that Rule 28 of the
Supreme Court Rules must be adopted instead of the procedure in Order 25 rule 7
(1) C.I 47. The Supreme Court rules provide that the registrar must issue a
certificate signed by the presiding judge and sealed before a judgment will be
enforced.[21]
I wish
to state right at the outset that, I do not share in the Supreme Court’s
preference for the provision in Rule 28. The reason is simply this: the
provision in Rule 28 of the Supreme Court Rules is suitable for the peculiar
circumstances where a judgment given by the Supreme Court can only be enforced
in the trial court. Since the trial court will be enforcing a judgment that is
not originating from that court, the Rules of Committee found it wise to demand
that the presiding judge must sign the certificate and the registrar must seal
it. This will leave no doubt in the trial court’s mind as to the nature of the
judgment it is being called upon to enforce.
Contrary to the new ethos propounded
in the Asamoah
case, it is worthy to
note that, in recent times, the Supreme Court has recognized the prominent role
judgment-creditors play when it comes to execution of judgments. The apex Court
has also held that, it has the power to enforce its own judgment under the
Constitution by adopting any rules of procedure applicable in any court in
Ghana. Therefore, it is not under any obligation to invoke Rule 28 of C.I 16 in
order to enforce its judgment and orders. In
Martin Alamisi Amidu v Attorney-General
, Waterville Holdings (BVI) Ltd
& 2 Others, Alfred Agbesi Woyome,[22]
it was noted that,
the
position taken by the applicant was based on the rather erroneous view that the
Court should have applied Rule 28 of C.I 16 and ask the High Court to enforce
the judgment in the case. The Court added that, “… it is not the duty or
business of Counsel for a judgment debtor to tell this Court how to enforce or
direct the enforcement of its decisions, judgments and orders.
The mode of selecting an enforcement
mechanism is the preserve of the judgment-creditor. Rule 28 is not mandatory
for the Court to comply with; it may invoke it if it so desires.
Thus, the
fact that the Court did not refer the enforcement to the High Court is a matter
of no consequence, as the Court has decided that it has the right, the means
and the power to enforce its own judgments and orders applying any existing
rules of practice available in any court in Ghana by virtue of Article 129 (4)
of the Constitution, in the absence of rules of enforcement under the Supreme
Court Rules, C.I. 16.”(Emphasis added)[23]
It is submitted that, if the Supreme Court does not feel itself bound to apply
Rule 28 of C.I 16 but chooses to reach into the rules of other courts to
enforce its judgments, then it is curious that the Supreme Court is now
prescribing its Rule 28 (that it does not fancy that much) to the High Court
that already has ample rules that the Supreme Court even prefers to adopt under
Article 129 (4). If the Supreme Court itself seeks refuge in Article 129 (4) of
the Constitution to escape applying the cumbersome procedure in Rule 28 of C.I
16 to enforce its judgment as happened in the Woyome case,[24]
then one is at a loss as to why the same Supreme Court will proffer that a
similar rule must be introduced into the High Court Rules in the Asamoah
case. Perhaps, a modern day
Trojan horse of a gift to the Bar?
Under
the High Court Rules, if a trial court hears a case and awards judgment in a
party’s favour, the judgment will be enforced by that trial court. And the
judgment- creditor or her lawyer who conducted the case and obtained the
judgment is, and will be, the best person to draw up the entry of judgment and
file it. Therefore, it will be wholly pointless to suggest that, after it has given
its judgment, the trial court must be saddled with an extra workload of
preparing a certificate, have it signed and sealed, and paid for, before the
judgment creditor can go into execution as it is under Rule 28 of C.I 16. There
must be an end to court procedures. At any rate, what will it profit a litigant
if she wins a case in court but cannot enter judgment through her lawyer?
G:
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is submitted that,
the current regime for drawing up entry of judgment by judgment-creditors or
their lawyers under the High Court Rules is adequate and the Supreme Court’s
directives or orders in Asamoah v S.I.C
are not only pointless, but they are unlawful. The new directives, if
implemented, will only succeed in adding a further layer on the already
congested judicial bureaucracy.
FOOTNOTES
[1]
Republic v Court of Appeal; Ex parte Ghana
Commercial Bank
Pensioners
Association [2001-2002] SCGLR 883; dictum of Afreh, JSC
[2] Ken Kwame Asamoah v State Insurance Company
Civil Appeal No. J4/55/2021, judgment dated 18th January, 2022, SC (unreported)
[3]
High
Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004, (C.I 47)
[4]
Supreme
Court Rules, 1996 (C.I 16)
[5]
Under
Order 18 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I 47)
[6]
See also
the following cases:
Ghana Consolidated
Diamonds Ltd v Tantuo
[2003-2004]
SCGLR 1136. The plaintiffs sued their
employers for the payment of their end of service benefits. The employers then
paid into court the sum in satisfaction of the plaintiffs’ claim. The
plaintiffs accepted and received the payment made into court but later filed a
notice of acceptance of the amount paid as part satisfaction of their claims. It
was held that the payment into court and acceptance ended the matter;
Smith & Others v Blankson (substituted
by) Baffour & Another[2007-2008] SCGLR 374
[7] Ken Kwame Asamoah v State Insurance Company
Civil Appeal No. J4/55/2021, judgment dated 18th January, 2022, SC (unreported)
at pg. 11
[8]
1996,
Rule 28 (C.I 16)
[9]
Order 41
rule 7 (1) of C.I 47 on drawing up and
entry of judgment or order provides thus: “The party seeking to have a
judgment entered shall draw up the judgment and present it to the Registrar for
entry.” And it is basic knowledge that, ‘the person seeking to have a judgment
entered’ is the judgment-creditor
[10]
Article
128 to 135 of the 1992 Constitution
[11]
Section
1 – 9 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459)
[12]
Order
41 rule 7 (1) of C.I 47
[13]
See:
Article 157 (2) of the Constitution, 1992; Section 80 of the Courts Act, 1993
(Act 459)
[14]
Even in
cases where the Supreme Court has found that the law has not made adequate
provision for safeguarding citizens’ rights, the Court has interpreted the law
to “avert a denial of justice and enhance the realisation of a constitutional
right.” See:
James David Brown v National
Labour Commission & Ahantaman Rural Bank Ltd
Civil Appeal No. J4/74/2018,
judgment dated 19th
June, 2019, SC (unreported). The Court has
not, with respect, usurped Parliament’s power and made laws on its own as it
seeks to usurp the Rules of Court Committee’s powers to make rules of procedure
for trial courts as it seeks to do in
Asamoah
v S.I.C.
[15]
See:
Order 25 rule 1 (5) of C.I 47
[16]
See:
Order 16 of C.I 47
[17]
[2012]
1 SCGLR 261 (Coram:
Georgina
Wood, C.J (presiding),
Brobbey, Rose Owusu, Yeboah and Bafffoe-Bonnie, JJ.SC)
[18]
Ibid.
See: Dictum of Anin Yeboah, JSC (as he then was) at 268 - 269
[19]
Civil
Appeal No. J4/55/2021, judgment dated 18th January, 2022, SC (unreported)
(Coram: Anin Yeboah, CJ (presiding), Pwamang, Amegatcher, Amadu and Kulendi,
JJ.SC.
[20]
Amegatcher, JSC, who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court (and one other
justice of the Supreme Court) sits as a member of the Disciplinary Committee of
the General Legal Council
[21]
Order
28 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I 16) states: “Where the Court directs
any judgment or order to be enforced by any other court, certificate in the
Form 12 set out in Part I of the Schedule to these Rules under the seal of the
Court and the hand of the presiding justice setting out the judgment or order
shall be transmitted by the Registrar to that other court, and the latter shall
enforce the judgment or order in the terms of the certificate.”
[22]
Civil
Motion No. J8/115/2017 ruling dated 4th
July, 2017, SC (unreported)
(Coram: Benin, JSC, sitting as a single judge)
[23]
Dictum
of Benin, JSC
[24]
See
footnote 13 above